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In today’s world it is no longer a question of whether a system will be 
compromised but when the system will be compromised. Consider the recent 
compromise of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and Hillary Clinton emails as 
well as the multiple Yahoo breaches and the break into the Target customer database. The 
list of exploited vulnerabilities and successful cyber-attacks goes on and on. Because of 
the amount and frequency of the cyber-attacks, resiliency has taken on a whole new 
meaning. There is a new perspective within defense to consider resiliency in terms of 
Mission Success.
This research develops a new approach of assessing resiliency from the Mission 
Engineering perspective. Mission Engineering is a new field of systems engineering 
where the Mission is the system of interest. The Mission requires a SoS with the goal of 
Mission Success. To the literature, this research contributes an approach to evaluate SoS 
resiliency based on Mission Success. An agent-based model (ABM) called the SoS 
architecture resiliency model (SARM) was developed and is a second contribution to the 
literature. The SARM includes a fuzzy architecture assessor (FAA) as well as SoS 
behavior represented using fuzzy decision analysis (FDA). The SARM uses DoD 
architecture framework (DoDAF) views and includes threats. Results show that resiliency 
can be measured using SARM given the systems, capabilities, and interfaces. Tests with a 
generic SoS and with a specific SoS provide a proof of concept for the method. To 
summarize, this research contributes to the literature a method and an executable model 
for evaluating architecture resiliency as well as the FAA and the FDA.
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This Resiliency has become important topic considering the recent cyber-attacks 
on emails. Consider the recent hack of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and 
Hillary Clinton emails [1][2]. These hacks demonstrated a lack of resilience in two 
different email systems which resulted in national consequences. Worse than that is the 
set of Yahoo breaches that first occurred in late 2016 and continued into early 2017 
[3][4][5]. In less than 6 months, Yahoo accounts were hacked three times! These 
examples illustrate the lack of resilience in those email systems.
According to cyber experts, it is no longer a matter of whether a system will 
experience a cyber-attack but rather a question of when the cyber-attack will occur and 
how well the system will respond to the cyber-attack. [6][67]. The ability of the system to 
continue to operate and satisfy its mission goals is a characteristic of the system. This 
characteristic of the system is something that must be designed into the system and is 
called resiliency.
The literature review in Section 2 identifies research in system resilience. While 
some of the system resilience research might also apply to system of systems (SoS), the 
development of the SoS is quite different from the system development. The system 
development adds capabilities to a system constrained by the system priorities, funding, 
and schedule. But in SoS development there are multiple sets of priorities and schedules 
set by the systems themselves. The SoS manager must pull together the system level
capabilities into higher level SoS capabilities and the SoS architecture. For this reason, 
the approach to SoS resiliency must be different from that used in the past to address 
system resiliency.
Within the literature, there seems to be a lack of SoS resilience. This research 
examines SoS resilience in terms of the SoS architecture and provides a methodology and 
model for investigating resilience in SoS. A new way of looking at resiliency is in terms 
of architecture and specifically SoS architecture. The SoS architecture really defines the 
SoS. Time to develop a new SoS architecture after a cyber incident (or cyber-attack) can 
be a measure of the SoS resiliency. A longer time for development would mean longer 
time to get capabilities to the warfighter or longer time to complete the mission. Thus, a 
SoS architecture that has a shorter time for re-development after a cyber-attack, would be 
a more resilient architecture.
This research developed a framework for modeling SoS architecture and 
evaluating the SoS resiliency. The SoS architecture resiliency model (SARM) is the 
result of this research.
1.2. DESCRIPTION
The SARM represents the SoS architecture using an agent-based model. The 
SARM receives the SoS architecture from the SoS architecture model and uses that as the 
SoS description. The Resiliency is defined as the degree to which the mission success can 
still be achieved after a cyber-attack. Resilience capacity is the measurement of 
resiliency.
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The SARM was developed as part of this novel approach to SoS resiliency 
assessment. The SARM is an agent-based model with models to represent the SoS 
manager and individual systems’ behavior. The system behavior is used to represent the 
systems’ ability to support the SoS request for capabilities. The SARM includes a threat 
whose behavior is used to represent vulnerability to the SoS to determine the resilience of 
the SoS architecture. The SARM includes a fuzzy assessment model to qualitatively 
evaluate the resilience of the SoS architecture that results from varying the systems’ 
behaviors. Some background and previous research are presented in the following 
section.
1.3. BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Initial research on resilience was mostly in the area of material strength.
Resilience in ecological systems followed and then resilience in urban planning. Today 
resilience is evident in many domains including psychology, enterprise, and engineering.
Early resilience models were not executable. More recently other models such as 
the ones by White [7] and Holt [8] do not provide an executable model. Long [9] talks 
about an executable model but just defines an approach to creating an executable SoS 
model from DoDAF views. The SARM, developed as part of this research, is executable 
and can be run with different scenarios to see the effect of different SoS architectures on 
resilience.
The SARM is an agent-based model (ABM) which more accurately reflects the 
real-world Enterprise or SoS development. Using an ABM preserves the independence 
and autonomy of the constituent systems which is essential characteristic of a SoS [10].
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Other models such as Bowen [11] use discrete event models to represent the 
asynchronous behavior of the constituent systems in the SoS. A discrete event model can 
only consist of sequences of events, which limits its ability to represent real world 
systems.
The SARM is adaptable and generic for any domain. Adjusting the input 
parameters allows the SARM to be applied to different domains. Except for White [7], 
previous models were specific to certain domains such as missile defense [12], immune 
system [11], weather [13], and threat detection [14]. The model defined in Baldwin [10] 
appears at first to be a generic SoS model, but on closer examination the implementation 
is actually a collaborative SoS.
White [7] provides a static class diagram of a SoS that includes the elements of a 
SoS namely: systems, event, state, data, and function and can be considered a generic 
model. However, the White model is not executable as is the SARM.
In summary, the SARM has the following advantages over previous models:
• Agent-based
• Enterprise or SoS level
• Generic/adaptable to multiple domains
• Executable
• Flexible for different SoS and system behaviors
More background research is presented in Section 2. The SARM developed in this 




1.4. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTIONS
1.4.1. Research Objectives. The objective of this research was to develop an 
approach to resiliency assessment based on mission success. Resiliency in the literature is 
focused on system resiliency and the approaches to resiliency are based on the resiliency 
of each component in the system. This research evaluates the resiliency of SoS with the 
understanding that the Mission is beyond the scope of a single system. This resiliency 
approach can be applied to the Enterprise level as well as the SoS level. So, within this 
research references to Enterprise are also appropriate.
1.4.2. Research Contributions. This research defines an approach to resiliency 
that is not found in the literature. Rather than approaching resiliency at the unit or 
component level, this research shows how SoS resiliency is evaluated based on the 
Mission. The Mission is the military, naval, or aerospace task that depends on the SoS for 
success. As mentioned in DoDAF v2.0 volume 1, Figure 2-2 [15], Missions drive the 
architectures, and the architectures align to the mission outcomes. If the desired mission 
outcome is success, then the architecture must align to the mission success.
The main contribution of this research is the approach to SoS architecture 
resiliency based on Mission Success. This research describes the role of the SoS 
architecture in the Mission and in Mission Success. An executable model, SARM, is 
created to qualitatively assess the SoS resiliency. An interface between the SoS 
architecture model and the SARM is designed so that the SoS resiliency is directly tied to 
the architecture. Finally, the SARM includes a threat agent that simulates the real-world 
obstacles to Mission Success. There are additional secondary contributions from this 
research, and they are mentioned below.
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One of the secondary contributions from this research is the SARM. Evaluation of 
architecture resilience at the Enterprise or SoS level required some way to represent 
architecture degradation due to exploitation of a vulnerability. An executable model was 
used to fulfill this need. Since the model should represent the real-world scenario as 
much as possible, an agent-based type of model was selected. An ABM best represents 
the independence and autonomous behavior of the constituent systems. An executable 
model allows running the model several times with different scenarios. The SARM is one 
of the contributions from this research. The SARM is an executable ABM that allows for 
the use of different models to represent the SoS manager behavior as well as the systems’ 
behaviors.
For this research it was necessary to create a method to assess the architecture 
resilience. As another secondary contribution, a fuzzy architecture assessment (FAA) was 
developed. The FAA uses fuzzy mathematics to qualitatively evaluate the architecture 
resilience. The FAA was developed in 2012 [16]. The FAA is described in more detail 
later in this dissertation.
In addition to the FAA, it was necessary to develop models that represent the SoS 
manager behavior and the systems’ behavior. Fuzzy decision analysis (FDA) and a fuzzy 
negotiation model (FNM) became another contribution from this research and were used 
to represent the SoS manager behavior. The FNM was designed to use a fuzzy associative 
memory (FAM) to represent the fuzzy rules. The behavior of the individual systems was 
represented using FDA and FAM as well as a probability model. These are all described
in detail later in this dissertation.
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As mentioned earlier, the interface between the SoS architecture model and the 
SARM was created. This leads to another contribution of this research, namely the 
incorporation of the DoDAF architecture views as the SoS architecture representation 
used in the SARM. Within the DoD programs there is increasing emphasis on 
representing system and SoS architectures using DoDAF views. Many of the DoDAF 
views are essentially unified modeling language (UML) or system modeling language 
(SysML) views that can be executed. Since the DoDAF views are required for every 
program they already exist in a manner that is understandable to the SoS and system 
managers. In addition, many organizations within the DoD maintain repositories of SoS 
and system architectures that are DoDAF views. Using the DoDAF views in the SARM 
provides a means to validate the DoDAF views.
To summarize, the contributions from this research are:
• Method to evaluate Enterprise or SoS architecture resilience
• SARM
• FAA
• FDA and FNM representing the SoS behavior
• FAM that contains fuzzy rules which can be altered for different scenarios
• Integration of the SoS architecture model with the SARM
For this research it is necessary to define an approach to evaluating architecture 




One way to evaluate architecture resilience is the time it takes to restructure the 
architecture so that mission success can still be accomplished after architecture 
degradation caused by an exploited vulnerability. Malicious threats seek to exploit 
Enterprise and SoS vulnerabilities with the aim of preventing mission success. The 
degree to which the architecture can still accomplish mission success is the resilience 
capacity. The greater the resilience capacity the better the Mission Resiliency.
In the SARM an architecture vulnerability is exploited, and the architecture 
becomes degraded. The Enterprise or SoS manager must negotiate with the constituent 
systems and determine how best to update the architecture to mitigate the vulnerability 
and still achieve mission success. The time it takes to do this is an indication of Mission 
Resilience. The longer it takes to evolve the SoS architecture after a cyber-attack, the less 
resilient. The shorter the time the greater the resilience. Resilience capacity is the inverse 
of this time.
1.6. RESEARCH RESULTS
The results are described in detail in Section 5 but are briefly described here.
This research describes a method to evaluate Mission Resiliency. This method is 
implemented in the SARM. Figure 1.1 shows the model results. The results show that the 
resilience capacity is related to the number of systems involved in the Mission. The 
system is involved in the Mission when the system supports the SoS request to provide 
certain capabilities. The evaluation of Mission Resiliency is dependent on the Mission. A














Number Negotiation Cycles vs Epochs
45 50 55 60 65 70
Epochs
Figure 1.1. Resilience Capacity in Terms of Negotiation Cycles
1.7. DISSERTATION ORGANIZATION
This dissertation is organized into sections. Section 1introduces the motivation for 
this research. Section 2 is the literature review that discusses the development and 
resilience of a SoS. Section 3 defines Mission Resilience. Section 4 describes the SoS 
Architecture Resiliency Model (SARM). Section 5 shows the results of this research. 
Section 6 summarizes the conclusions. Section 7 describes future work. Section 8
provides the definitions and assumptions.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
This section focuses on SoS development and resilience. Other topics related to 
this research are discussed in other sections within this dissertation.
2.1. BACKGROUND
Resilience research was first in the areas of the textile industry, urban planning, 
and disaster preparedness. As technology grew so did adversarial attack on the 
cyberspace which led to resilience research in information technology (IT) systems such 
as networks, computers, and other IT systems. Most of this resilience research has 
evaluated resilience in a bottom-ups approach using a resilience value for each 
configuration item in some combination to achieve an overall system resilience value. 
While this approach works for evaluating system resilience, this does not work for 
evaluating mission resilience.
Webster’s dictionary defines resilience as “an ability to recover from or adjust 
easily to misfortune or change” [17]. Reggiani provides another definition of resilience as 
the amount of disturbance that a system can absorb before it moves away from an 
equilibrium state to another state [18]. According to this definition, a resilient system 
would be one that could absorb a catastrophic event and maintain the same capabilities.
The earliest work in resilience is in engineering sciences in the resilience of 
materials. The Charpy impact test (sometimes referred to as the Charpy specimen test) 
was devised in 1900 to test the resilience in metals [19] [20]. Later in the middle of the
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20th century, resiliency was applied in textile industry [21][22] to determine the strength 
of materials. This resilience like the Charpy test was done as a physical test.
Resilience then appeared in evaluation of ecological systems [23][24]. Berkes and 
Folke were the first to integrate ecological and social resilience. Holling was the first to 
propose resilience and capacity found in those ecological systems that would be classified 
as unstable. The instability being the characteristic that caused the ecological system to 
survive. More on resilience capacity in the next section.
In the early part of the 21st century, resiliency research was applied to urban 
renewal and city planning. Cities and urban areas were evaluated for their resilience to 
changing population demographics as well as resilience to a natural catastrophe [25]. 
More recently resilience in Ecology was given a more precise definition as change in 
response to disturbance [26].
Resilience has been recently researched in many different areas including 
ecosystems, psychology, enterprise, and engineering [27]. Having briefly outlined the 
background for resiliency, the next sections describe resiliency research as applied in 
systems, architecture, and SoS.
2.1.1. Resilience in Systems. Recently, system resiliency has become a hot topic 
of research. This is due to the increase in cyber-attacks that exploit system vulnerabilities 
and result in degraded or failed system performance. Whether the system is a medical 
patient system or a satellite system, the probability of cyber-attacks is high. Cyber experts 
indicate that it is not a question of whether a cyber-attack will occur but when it will 
occur. For this reason, resiliency as a system attribute has become important. But the
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question remains: how to measure system resilience. This has prompted research into the 
area of system resilience. Some of this research is presented in the following paragraphs.
Argonne Lab was one of the first to define resilience in terms of other 
characteristics. This was to assess the resilience of a community or a region. Argonne 
Lab has put together the parts of resilience with the measures that enhance resiliency. 
Argonne defines resilience as composed of anticipate, resist, absorb, respond, adapt, and 
recover [28]. For each of the components, Argonne defines an action to enhance 
resilience. Actions are being prepared, mitigation, response, and recovery. According to 
Argonne, being prepared enhances anticipate; mitigation enhances resist and absorb; 
response enhances respond and adapt; and finally, recovery enhances recover. Three 
categories of approaches they call quantitative approaches: implement resilience 
strategies prior to unusual event; implement resilience strategies after the event; 
implement resilience strategies before, during, and after the event.
Resilience has been used in ecology and archaeology. A paper by Juan-Garcia and 
others [29] provides a background and history of resilience in ecology. The paper 
categorizes ecology papers that deal with resilience but provides no new information.
In addition to the Argonne Lab paper, there are papers in the literature that define 
resilience in terms of other characteristics. One of those papers describes resilience in the 
motor-fuel supply chain (FSC). The paper by Beheshtian and others applies network 
resilience concepts to the motor-fuel supply chain [30]. This paper provides a 
mathematical representation of resilience in FSC and evaluates the ability of the FSC to 
recover from a failure due to unusual events. In this paper, resilience is defined in terms 
of three characteristics: absorption, adaptation, and restoration. Beheshtian’s paper
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describes a mathematical model to maximize resilience in FSC. Resilience in motor-fuel 
supply chain depicted in a quantitative model evaluates a system’s ability to recover from 
a failure due to unusual events. This paper defines resilience. But it does not really define 
exactly what is meant by absorption, adaptation, or restoration. The paper claims to 
provide a qualitative approach but the details only reveal a quantitative model and data. 
This contrasts with the Argonne Lab paper that describes resilience using three additional 
characteristics. Neither paper models nor provides case study using these characteristics. 
In practice more characteristics does not necessarily provide a better picture of resilience 
as the lines differentiating the characteristics becomes more indeterminate.
Another paper that uses the three characteristics for resilience is the research by 
Nan & Sansavini [31] in the electric power domain. Nan & Sansavini apply resilience to 
the electric power infrastructure and describe resilience in terms of absorption, 
adaptation, and recovery. This paper provides definitions for these characteristics. 
Absorptive capability defined as ability to reduce negative impacts in the system from a 
disruptive event. Adaptive capability defined as ability to self-organize and adapt the 
system to minimize consequences. Restorative capability is ability to repair the system.
One domain that is receiving a lot of attention is the energy domain. There are 
different approaches to resilience in the energy domain. One approach to resilience 
involves decoupling the subsystems [32]. This was described as a method for resilience in 
the electric power grid. By decoupling the subsystems each subsystem was able to 
continue to provide electricity if one subsystem was attacked. The approach required 
each subsystem to also be used as a testbed to test the ability of the grid to continue 
operation when one of the subsystems went down. Decoupling can support resilience but
is not a solution for most systems. Another approach to resilience in the energy domain 
involves the energy storage system [33] which is necessary for photovoltaic (PV) 
generation. The paper by Confrey shows the resilience for different energy storage 
system architectures.
Resilience is described in the archaeological domain [34][35]. Bradtmoller 
includes a literature review of the resilience research and points out the multiple ways 
that resilience is defined and used in archaeology. Weiberg describes resilience in 
Aegean archaeology with respect to the adaptation cycle.
Wang proposes developing countermeasures for cyber-attacks as a method to 
resilience in the financial domain [36]. Command and control (C&C) of Botnets is 
usually a Block-chain architecture with various mechanisms. This paper describes the 
different mechanisms and how to disrupt them to protect the system. As new Block-chain 
mechanisms emerge, new counter-mechanisms should be developed to take down the 
Block-chain. This paper is specific to defending against Botnets that have a Block-chain 
architecture and does not work for other domains.
Resilience has also been applied to hardware architectures [37][38][39]. Leng and 
Kalra both address resilience in the Graphic Processor Unit (GPU) but approach it in 
different ways. Ascia describes resilience in the chip design for wireless communication. 
Asymmetric resilience is described for computer hardware where the responsibilities are 
split between the parts [37]. The GPU is responsible for detecting the cyber-attack and 
the CPU is responsible for recovery. This paper is focused on low level architecture of 
computer hardware so the approach to resilience only works for computer hardware.
Kalra uses a static approach to resilience by means of a compiler to support resilience in
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the GPU [38]. ArmorAll is a compiler for software system that uses a GPU. ArmorAll 
optimizes duplicate instructions in order to enhance resilience. Ascia states that the 
architecture of the wireless network on a chip has a tradeoff between resilience and 
energy [39]. This paper suggests some methods for keeping the energy requirement low 
while maintaining resilience if the user can provide some details of the data in the 
communication. All three papers are specific to hardware and not applicable to other 
domains. On the other hand, the SARM, to be described later, can be applied to the 
hardware domain.
This concludes the look at resilience in systems. The next section provides a look 
at resilience in architecture.
2.1.2. Resilience in Architecture. Resilience in architecture is not well 
represented in the literature. But it is especially important for cyber physical systems. 
Some resilience in architecture has been in the construction domain [40] [41]. Campos 
deals with resilience in the architecture of school buildings [40] and argues that resilience 
means the school building should motivate learning. Hardiilla & Nugroho describe 
resilience in vernacular architecture as an integral part of Urban Planning [41] to 
accommodate cultural and social change. Both papers are specific to physical buildings 
and not applicable to other domains. The model described in the next paragraph could be 
used in this domain.
One paper describes how resilience in architecture can be modeled [42]. The 
paper by Acheson describes an agent-based model that determines architecture resilience. 
In this paper the SoS architecture resilience model (SARM) is described, and resilience is 
defined by how well the architecture handles a cyber-attack. More on this paper later.
15
16
Having discussed resilience in systems and in architecture, the next section 
describes resilience in a SoS.
2.1.3. Resilience in SoS. Within the literature there are examples of resilience in 
SoS. One of them is applied to a SoS that assists automobile drivers [43]. This driver 
assist SoS consists of a lead vehicle with a following vehicle that must maintain a safe 
distance between the vehicles. The communication between the vehicles is normally 
wireless but the research suggests using a speed estimator in the follower vehicle to 
estimate the lead vehicle’s motion. So, the resilience approach is not use wireless 
communication which is susceptible to cyber-attack. But rather to estimate the distance to 
the lead vehicle. This is a specific approach to resilience that does not work in most 
cases. Most all modern vehicles have wireless communication and replacing the wireless 
communication with an estimator will not work in most cases.
One of the resilience papers seems appropriate for the current year as it involves 
voting and media influence [44]. This is an agent-based model where the voter is an 
agent. Media influence is an external influence on the agent. This paper simulates the 
effect on voting after a terrorist attack as happened in the Spanish election in March of 
2004. The simulation reproduced the spread of the media coverage of the terrorist attacks 
using an agent population. The simulation also models the voting in the Spanish election 
after the terrorist attacks. The agent-based simulation best represents the voter actions 
and media coverage. This paper describes resilience in terms of a voter’s action to not be 
influenced by the terrorist attack. External influence of the media coverage of terrorist 
attack on the voter choosing who to vote for. Resilience is the magnitude of the external 
influence needed to get the voter to change its vote.
One approach to resilience in SoS is to use contracts and negotiation to create a 
collaborative resilient SoS [45]. Kilian calls this engineering resilience into the system. 
The approach lacks any method of assessing the system resilience or determining where 
there might be vulnerabilities. It also does not consider the Mission in the evaluation of 
resilience. The modeling in this paper is just a paper representation and not implemented 
in a modeling tool where it could be validated across the systems or executed.
Resilience in SoS can be modeled [42]. The paper by Acheson describes 
resilience in an SoS using the SoS architecture. This paper uses an agent-based model to 
represent the SoS and the threat as agents and resilience is determined by how well the 
SoS can respond to the cyber-attack.
While this section does focus on resilience in SoS, it is important to note that this 
is related to Mission Resilience. Recall that Mission Engineering is where the Mission is 
the system of interest and the Mission requires an underlying SoS. Mission success is 
dependent on a SoS that can complete the mission. Mission resilience is defined as the 
ability to successfully complete the Mission despite cyber-attacks. The paper by Acheson 
and Dagli [42] describes the SoS Architecture Resiliency Model (SARM) which bases 
the resiliency evaluation on Mission Success. Further details of SARM are in Section 3.
The literature mentioned in this and the previous sections focused on research in 
resilience for systems, architecture, and SoS. But, as mentioned earlier, one of the 
questions is how to quantify resilience. Research in resilience quantification is provided 
in the next section.
2.1.4. Resiliency and Resilience Capacity. One of the first to consider a 
quantitative value for resilience is Mebarki [19]. Mebarki defined resilience index as the
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capacity for metal to absorb a disturbance. This is structural resilience and not system or 
SoS resilience. But it is a way to quantify resilience using a boundary for resilience and 
categorizing the resilience as supra-resilient or non-resilient depending on whether the 
resilience index is above or below an optimum or threshold value, respectively. A more 
recent view of resilience capacity is purported by Jackson as mentioned in the following 
paragraph.
Jackson defines resilience as a combination of avoidance, survival, and recovery 
and considers brittleness to be the opposite of resilient [46]. Jackson also defines capacity 
as the ability of a system to absorb a disruption without loss of capability [46]. It is easy 
to see the similarity of this “capacity” to the resilience index Mebarki [19] defined.
In social science the resilience capacity index (RCI) refers to the degree to which 
a metropolitan area can absorb a disruption without the loss of capability. One non-profit 
organization defines Resilience Capacity Index (RCI) in terms of twelve factors [47]. The 
ability of an urban area to jump back after change is hypothetically influenced by these 
twelve factors. The RCI is used to compare metropolitan regions. While this definition 
seems reasonable, there does not seem to be any details on how it is calculated.
Chen specifies RCI in terms of a disaster and coins the term DRC: “Disaster 
Resilience Capacity (DRC) is ability of community to survive following a disaster” [48]. 
Changes to a community can be from disasters or from the normal evolution of the area, 
such as the movement of people to/from the area for jobs.
Recently, General Hyden used the term “resilience capacity” as a measure of 
system resiliency [49]. Hyten explains that a physical number like the MTBF is not 
useful in describing resiliency. The resilience is determined by whether the Mission can
be completed. Will Mission Success be achieved in a contested environment? Hyten 
again describes resiliency in terms of space architectures and capabilities at the NDIA 
Luncheon in 2015 [50]. Here Hyten talks about resilient space architectures and using 
other characteristics such as disaggregation to define resilience. General Hyten further 
expanded on this idea at the 2016 Space Symposium by defining a resilient enterprise as 
one whose vision is focused on the threats [51]. Hyten specifically mentioned the need 
for a resilient enterprise and resilient capabilities. Resilient capabilities are designed with 
the threats in mind. The degree to which the system supports mission success in a 
contested environment is resilience capacity.
Resilience specific to Mission Engineering, which involves a SoS, is somewhat 
lacking in the literature. In order to look at resilience specific to Mission Engineering, it 
is necessary to consider the SoS that enables the mission. As mentioned earlier, the paper 
on modeling SoS resiliency [42] describes a technique that can be used for evaluating 
Mission Resiliency. This technique involves evaluating SoS resiliency in terms of 
Mission Success. For this research, resilience capacity is defined in terms of Mission 
Success. The following section describes how resilience capacity is related to Mission 
Success.
2.2. LITERATURE SUMMARY
Initial resilience was specific to metals and later applied to urban planning. 
Current research into system resiliency mostly focuses on the system or parts of the 
system. As mentioned earlier, Mission Resilience is lacking in the literature. This 
dissertation fills this gap by addressing Mission Resilience.
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The literature is also lacking in a model of resilience. Jackson developed a generic 
state transition diagram that can be used to evaluate system resiliency [66] but only if the 
system is described in terms of states. The state transition diagram is not executable. This 
research fills another gap and provides an executable model that can be used to evaluate 
Mission Resiliency as well as SoS and system resiliency. The model is an updated 
version of the SoS Architecture Resiliency Model (SARM) [42] which is discussed in a 
latter section. Before that some context for this research is needed. The context is Mission 
Resilience and is discussed in the following section.
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3. MISSION RESILIENCE
In Mission Engineering, the purpose for the SoS is to fulfill some mission or task 
that requires capabilities at a higher level than system capabilities. SoS level capabilities 
depend on contributions from each of the constituent systems to provide a system level 
capability that supports the higher level SoS capability. Capabilities from each 
constituent system contribute to the overall SoS capabilities. Cyber-attacks remove 
system level capabilities which in turn affect the SoS level capabilities. If the SoS can 
still accomplish and fulfill the mission after a cyber-attack, then mission success is 
achieved and the SoS can be considered resilient. The SARM uses this method to assess 
resiliency of the SoS. But first some descriptions are in order.
Mission Engineering has a Mission and an underlying SoS to support the Mission. 
The SoS is defined by its architecture and the architecture determines the resilience of the 
SoS. Mission Resilience is defined as the ability of the SoS to complete the Mission 
despite cyber-attacks.
Cyber-attacks will happen and can result in losing a system in the SoS or an 
interface in the SoS. When a system or interface is lost, the SoS must adjust to replace the 
missing capability with another capability (or capabilities) that will still support Mission 
Success. This process of replacing the missing capability amounts to a re-architecture of 
the SoS with the goal of Mission Success.
The loss of a system or interface means that the SoS, and hence the Mission, can 
no longer depend on that system/interface. The SoS is in a degraded state when this 
happens. So, the question is whether Mission Success can still be achieved in this
degraded state. In the degraded state a re-architecture is performed to account for the 
reduction in capability. It is possible that a specific capability is not needed for the 
Mission Thread and Mission Success can be achieved without that capability. For this 
research, it is assumed that the capability is necessary for the Mission Thread. Since the 
capability is necessary for the Mission Thread, a cyber-attack that takes out the capability 
can result in Mission Failure. Mission Resilience would mean that Mission Success 
would still occur despite the capability loss. For this to happen, some other system 
capability (or capabilities) must replace the lost system capability. The measure of 
Mission Resilience is Resilience Capacity.
Resilience capacity is the degree to which the SoS can still deliver the Mission 
despite a cyber-attack that results in the loss of a system or interface. After the loss of the 
system or interface the SoS must reconfigure the SoS architecture for a workaround to the 
loss. A system or interface loss really means losing the system level capability that feeds 
into the SoS higher level capability. To see how the system level capability relates to the 
SoS level capability consider the following description.
There are two aspects to resilience capacity. Mission Success depends on 
backfilling or replacing or finding a work around for the capability lost when the cyber­
attack removed the system or the interface. But Mission Success also depends on getting 
the workaround capability within the required time frame. Workaround in this context 
refers to either a replacement or substitution or method of overcoming the system or 
interface loss. So, the first step in the process is finding the workaround which means re­
architecting the SoS to support the Mission Thread.
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According to the MEI Guidebook [52], a Mission Thread is a “series of integrated 
end-to-end tasks linked by interoperable interfaces required to successfully achieve a 
desired outcome within a given tactical situation”. The Mission Thread can be viewed as 
a sequence of tasks. Equation (1) show the Mission Thread:
Mission Thread = T1, T2 , . . . ,  T0 (1)
Each task requires one or more SoS capabilities. Each task can be represented as 
shown in equation (2 ):
Ti =  C1, C 2 , . . . , C L (2)
Each SoS capability requires multiple system level capabilities. Each SoS 
capability can be represented by the sequence of system capabilities as shown in equation
(3):
= cj,k, cj+l,k=l, ■■■, Cj+R,k+R (3)
where cj,k is capability k of system j
Thus, each task in the Mission Thread can be represented by a set of system level 
capabilities from the constituent systems relevant to the Mission Thread. Equation (4) 
shows this representation:
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Ti — cj,k> cj+l,k=l’ ■■■, Cj+R,k+R (4)
The SoS capabilities are documented and decomposed on the DoDAF CV-2 
diagram. Many projects use the DoDAF framework to describe the architecture. Each 
SoS level capability is a composition of lower level system capabilities. The lower level 
system capabilities are the decomposition of the SoS capabilities on the SoS CV-2 
diagram. The SoS SV-5b shows the allocation of the capabilities to the individual 
systems. Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 illustrate the CV-2 and SV-5b, respectively.
The CV-2 and SV-5b feed into the SARM to describe the capabilities. The cyber­
attack consists of removing one of the system capabilities at the lowest level of the CV-2. 
The system capability at the lowest level of the CV-2 is one of the capabilities needed to 
complete the Mission. It is required for the Mission Thread.
The CV-2 and SV-5b feed into the SARM to describe the capabilities. The cyber­
attack consists of removing one of the system capabilities at the lowest level of the CV-2. 
The system capability at the lowest level of the CV-2 is one of the capabilities needed to 
complete the Mission. It is required for the Mission Thread.
A cyber-attack can cause the loss of a system or interface which results in loss of 
one or more of the system level capabilities (ci) mentioned above. For this research, the 
loss of the system level capability affects Mission Success, and the system level 
capability is part of SoS capability that is part of the Mission Thread. The cyber-attack 
and subsequent loss of the system capability triggers a re-architecture of the SoS.
The re-architecture takes the form of the SoS requesting new capabilities from 
some or all the constituent systems. The SoS request includes the required capabilities,
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Figure 3.1. CV-2 Showing the Capabilities Taxonomy
required performance, and time to provide the capabilities. Each system responds to the 
SoS request with what it can provide and the SoS determines if that will support the 
Mission Thread and Mission Success. The cycle continues until Mission Success can be 
achieved. The time required to get to Mission Success is the resilience capacity. The 
longer it takes to evolve the SoS architecture after a cyber-attack, the less resilient. The 
shorter the time the greater the resilience. The SARM then evaluates the best
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Figure 3.2. SV-5b Showing the Capabilities Allocated to a Specific System
workaround for the available time frame. The SARM measured how long it takes to 
restructure the SoS architecture so that the Mission can be successfully completed.
Details of the SARM are in the next section.
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4. SOS RESILIENCY ARCHITECTURE MODEL (SARM)
This section describes the SoS Architecture Resiliency Model (SARM). SARM is 
a key component of determining Mission Resilience. Mission Resilience is defined as the 
ability to still complete the Mission despite a cyber-attack. This research developed an 
approach and a model to assess Mission Resilience. The approach assumes a cyber-attack 
results in the loss of a system level capability that is required to support a SoS capability 
required for the Mission Thread. The SoS architecture must be re-structured to 
accommodate the loss and so that the Mission can still be accomplished. This approach is 
illustrated in the SARM.
SARM is an agent-based model [42] which was extended from the SoS 
architecture model [53]. The mathematical foundation for the SoS architecture model was 
described in 2012 [54] [55]. The model structure was explained in 2013 [53]. The SARM 
is an extension of the SoS architecture model [42] that adds resilience from a Mission 
success perspective. The SARM is an agent-based model that includes a Threat agent.
In an agent-based model, the agents are the building blocks. An agent is 
abstraction of the characteristics and behavior of some entity. The abstraction becomes a 
real representation in the model when the agent is instantiated. Until the agent is 
instantiated it remains an abstraction or just an idea and is not actually a physical piece of 
the model. Each instantiation becomes its own process.
SARM has three agents: SoS agent, System agent, and Threat agent. The SoS 
agent gets the SoS capabilities from the DoDAF capability views. The SoS coordinates 
with the constituent systems to get the system capabilities from them that are needed to
support the SoS level capabilities. The system agent has constraints that can affect its 
ability to provide capabilities to the SoS. Both the SoS agent and the system agent have 
inherent behavior that represents the activities in interfacing between the two.
The Threat agent attacks systems which results in the removal of a system 
capability. The capability loss triggers the SoS to perform a re-architecture of the SoS so 
that the Mission can continue. The SARM keeps track of the time it takes to re-architect 
which is used to determine the Mission Resilience.
The SARM makes use of multiple underlying models. The SARM pulls all these 
models together to determine the Mission Resilience. These underlying models consist of 
the SoS behavior model, the SoS architecture assessment, and the system behavior 
model. SARM is designed so that other models can be used for any of these underlying 
models. The SARM starts with the SoS capabilities which are delineated in DoDAF 
views.
The DoDAF CV-2 views (Figure 3.1) show the SoS capabilities. The SV-5b 
views (Figure 3.2) show the system level capabilities that support the SoS level 
capabilities. And the SV-1 views show the system interfaces. Figure 4.1 below is an 
example of an SV-1 view.
The SoS agent first determines what capabilities are needed from which systems 
as defined in the SV-5b views. The SoS agent then requests those system capabilities 
from the respective systems. When the SoS agent receives the system responses the SoS 
architecture assessment mode is invoked to determine whether the Mission can be 
completed. If the Mission can be completed, then the resilience capacity is calculated 
based on the time it took to get the architecture to this point. If the Mission cannot be
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Figure 4.1. SV-1 Showing the System Interfaces
completed the process is repeated starting with the SoS re-architecture and the cycle 
continues until Mission Success can be achieved. It is possible that certain architectures 
with certain cyber-attacks might not ever reach Mission Success in which case the 
Mission Resilience is zero or negative. Figure 4.2 shows the SARM structure.
The first paragraphs in this section provided a high-level description of the 
structure of the SARM. The following sections describe the details of the components 
that make up the SARM.
4.1. SOS AGENT
This section describes the details of the SoS agent. The SoS development starts 




Figure 4.2. SARM Structure
In addition, each capability is weighted according to its degree of importance to 
the warfighter mission. Mathematically these are represented in equation (5):
S o S . C i =  ( C i , C 2 > - > C v)  (5)
where SoS.Ci represents the set of capabilities necessary to complete the Mission. These 
are the desired capabilities that the SoS requests of the systems in order to complete the 
Mission despite the loss due to a cyber-attack. Each Ci represents a SoS level capability 
that is comprised of a set of system level capabilities as shown in equation (3).
Each SoS capability is weighted, and the weights are represented by equation (6):
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SoS.Wi = (w1,w2, . . . w n ) (6 )
where,
i = Capability number
n = number of capabilities needed for the Mission 
wi = weight for the SoS level capability i
The weights (wi) are fuzzy values which are {None, Low, High, Heavy}. The 
fuzzy membership function for weight is shown in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3. Weight Fuzzy Membership Function
Associated with each SoS capability is a level of performance necessary for 
Mission Success. Desired performance for each capability is represented as equation (7).
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SoS.P[ — (P  ̂P2, . . .  Pn ) (7)
Each performance (Pi) associated with a capability requires one or more systems 
to provide a performance (pi) for that capability. When those one or more systems 
provide the pi for that Ci, then the Pi is present for that Ci at the SoS level. Each SoS level 
performance (Pi) has an associated SoS funding Fi and SoS deadline Di. Just as the SoS 
performance is allocated to performance (pi) from one or more systems, the SoS funding 
(Fi) and SoS deadline (Di) are also allocated to funding (fi) and deadline (di) to one or 
more systems. This represented in equations (8), (9), and (10).
where,
i = Capability number 
n = number of capabilities 
N = number of systems
The pi, fi, and di for each Ci are passed to each system responsible for that Ci by 
the SoS agent. The p_oldi, f_oldi, and d_oldi are the performance, funding, and deadline 
values for each Ci used by the SoS agent in the previous negotiation cycle.
The p_gapi, f_gapi, and d_gapi for each Ci are the differences between what the 
SoS agent requested of the systems and what the systems agreed to provide. These are the
P i—l Nk=iPk 
Fi — Y l= ifk 




delta deadline, delta funding, and delta performance returned by the constituent systems. 
Mathematically these are represented by equations (11), (12), and (13).
P_gm = \pi-p_oldi\ (11)
f_gm  = \fi -  f_oldt\ (12)
d_gapi = \di — d_oldi\ (13)
As mentioned above, the first step is the fuzzification of the performance, 
funding, and deadline gap values. Table 1 shows how the gap values are fuzzified.
Table 4.1. Fuzzification for Gap Values
None Low High Extreme
Performance Gap 0 < 2 < 7 and > 2 > 7
Funding Gap 0 < 3.5 < 6.5 and > 3.5 > 6.5
Deadline Gap 0 < 20 < 80 and > 20 > 80
The fuzzified values act as indices into the FAM to extract the adjustments to be 
made to the performance, funding, and deadline. Mathematically this is represented as in 
equations (14), (15), and (16).
p _ g a p _ a d j u s t i  =  F A M _ P e r f ( p _ g a p _ f u z z y i, f _ g a p _ f u z z y i, d _ g a p _ f u z z y i) (14)
f _ g a p _ a d j u s t i  =  F A M _ F u n d ( p _ g a p _ fu z z y i ,  f _ g a p _ f u z z y i , d _ g a p _ f u z z y i )  (15)
d _ g a p _ a d j u s t i  =  F A M _ D e a d ( p _ g a p _ f u z z y i ,  f _ g a p _ f u z z y i , d _ g a p _ f u z z y i )  (16)
The final step in the FDA is defuzzification of the fuzzy values for performance 
adjustment, funding adjustment, and deadline adjustment. The FDA uses the centroid
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method of defuzzification which is represented mathematically in equation.
y =
I,? -T  x e v M  = g - r x i ^ x C x i )  
S f lice  ^ x ( x i ) (17)
where
slice = the total number of pieces 
^ x ( x i)  =  the fuzzy membership function
As can be seen from the above defuzzification equation, defuzzification depends 
on the fuzzy membership function for each fuzzy variable. Performance gap has the fuzzy 
values {None, Low, High, Extreme}. The fuzzy membership function for performance 
gap is shown in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4. Performance Gap Fuzzy Membership Function
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Funding gap has the fuzzy values {None, Low, High, Extreme}. The fuzzy 
membership function for funding gap is shown in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5. Funding Gap Fuzzy Membership Function
Deadline gap has the fuzzy values {None, Low, High, Extreme}. The fuzzy 
membership function for deadline gap is shown in Figure 4.6.
Performance adjustment has the fuzzy values {Nothing, Decrease, Increase, 
Increase_Much}. The fuzzy membership function for performance adjustment is shown 
in Figure 4.7.
Funding adjustment has the fuzzy values {Nothing, Decrease, Increase, 
Increase_Much}. The fuzzy membership function for funding adjustment is shown in 
Figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.6. Deadline Gap Fuzzy Membership Function
Figure 4.7. Performance Adjustment Fuzzy Membership Function
Deadline adjustment has the fuzzy values {Nothing, Decrease, Increase, 
Increase_Much}. The fuzzy membership function for deadline adjustment is shown in 
Figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.8. Funding Adjustment Fuzzy Membership Function
Figure 4.9. Deadline Adjustment Fuzzy Membership Function
The SoS agent structure is illustrated in Figure 4.10. The SoS state transition 
diagram shows the states of the SoS agent. The SoS State Transition Diagram is provided 




Figure 4.10. SoS Agent Structure
The Initialization state is the first state and where all the variables are initialized. 
In the Evolve state the SoS determines the SoS architecture based on the DoDAF 
diagrams. The Plan state sends the request for capabilities to each system and creates the 
SoS architecture from the responses. The Implement phase determines the feasibility of 
the SoS architecture and decides whether the architecture will support Mission Success or 
not. If yes, then the SoS goes into the Evolve state waiting for another set of capabilities
from the DoDAF diagrams. If no, then the SoS goes back to the Plan state to request a 
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Figure 4.11. SoS Agent State Transition Diagram
The SoS architecture defines the capabilities provided by the constituent systems. 
The SoS has an initial desired SoS architecture but the final actual SoS architecture 
depends on what the constituent systems can provide. The SoS architecture assessment 
provides a qualitative view of the SoS architecture. Because this is a qualitative 
assessment, a fuzzy assessor is appropriate. The next section describes the fuzzy assessor.
4.1.1. SoS Architecture Assessment. One of the steps in system engineering is 
architecture development. The architecture development process includes evaluation of 
the architecture for characteristics of a good architecture. The architecture evaluation is a 
qualitative assessment like the requirements assessment described in a paper by Acheson 
[57]. The architecture evaluation uses a fuzzy assessor [16] that is an extension of the 
requirement assessor [57]. The architecture assessor uses architecture attributes instead of 
the requirements attributes used in the requirements assessor. The architecture assessor 
also uses different membership functions as shown in the figures in the next subsection.
One of the architecture characteristics is resilience. Resilience in architecture 
reflects the resilience of the system. Early detection of low resilience allows time for re­
architecting to increase resilience.
The purpose of the SoS is the fielding of capabilities to the warfighter. The set of 
capabilities of the SoS is the SoS architecture. The SoS starts with the set of capabilities 
which is a desired SoS architecture. The SoS requests required capabilities from the 
constituent systems. The architecture assessment is a qualitative assessment using a fuzzy 
assessor. The resultant architecture is the architecture based on what capabilities and 
performance the systems agree to provide based on their constraints.
This section describes the SoS architecture assessor used to perform the 
qualitative architecture evaluation in this research.
For this research, the attributes of affordability, flexibility, robustness, and 
performance were chosen, and fuzzy membership functions are defined for them. In this 
research the following definitions for the architecture attributes are used. Affordability is 
a fuzzy variable and is based on the capabilities acquired versus the amount of fund the
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SoS manager must expend. Ideally the SoS manager would like to get the most amount of 
capabilities for the least amount of money. For this reason, affordability is defined as the 
ratio of the capabilities acquired over the amount of funding the SoS manager must spend 
to acquire the capabilities from the individual systems. When the SoS manager does not 
need to spend very much money to get additional capabilities from the constituent 
systems, the SoS architecture is considered very affordable. Flexibility is a fuzzy variable 
and is defined as percentage of systems that participate in the SoS architecture. The more 
systems that participate the more flexible the SoS architecture would be to include 
additional future capabilities. Systems that already participate in the SoS would have 
established relationships with other systems and thus would make incorporation of future 
capabilities easier. Robustness is a fuzzy variable and is defined as the ability of the SoS 
to continue to provide the desired capabilities even under adverse circumstances. The 
SoS capabilities depend on system-to-system interfaces. If one interface fails, then it is 
possible that a combination of the other interfaces would still provide the required SoS 
capability. For this reason, the SoS robustness is a function of the number of system-to- 
system interfaces for those systems that participate in the SoS. Performance is a fuzzy 
variable and is defined as the overall performance of the SoS. Performance is defined as 
the aggregation of all the performances from all the capabilities supplied by the 
constituent systems compared to the aggregation of performances requested by the SoS. 
This comparison is the ratio of acquired performances over the requested performances.
The fuzzy assessor first determines the affordability, flexibility, robustness, and 
performance of the SoS architecture. The values for these are fuzzified and then become 
the fuzzy inputs to the fuzzy associative memory (FAM) that is part of the fuzzy assessor.
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The FAM contains the fuzzy rules used to qualitatively evaluate the SoS architecture and 
produces a SoS architecture quality value that is a fuzzy value. This fuzzy quality value is 
then defuzzified and is compared to the expected SoS architecture quality value. When 
the fuzzy quality value reaches the expected quality value the cycle of negotiations stops.
4.1.1.1. Mathematical representation. In the following equations, the variable N 
is the total number of systems and M is the total number of capabilities at the SoS level.
In the fuzzy assessor, the architecture attributes of affordability, flexibility, 
robustness, and performance are used to evaluate the SoS architecture. Each of these 
architecture attributes are crisp values that must be fuzzified. The affordability fuzzy 
variable has the values of {Expensive, Costly, Reasonable, Very Affordable}. Its 
fuzzification is shown in Table 2. The total SoS funding is used to determine the value of 
the affordability variable and is determined by equation (18).
Afford(SoS. Arch.)
y ¥  y^ r  c -y j=\y l=\
Total SoS Funding (18)
Table 4.2. Fuzzification of Affordability
Fuzzification of Affordability
Ratio of Capabilities Provided to SoS Funding Spent
Expensive Costly Reasonable Very Affordable
Architecture > 1.5 between 1 and 1.5 between 0.5 and 1 < 0.5
The flexibility fuzzy variable has the values of {Rigid, Pliable, Flexible, Very 
Flexible}. The SoS flexibility is determined using the aggregate ability of the constituent 
systems to adapt to new SoS requests as shown in equation (19). The fuzzification of 
flexibility is shown in Table 3.
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Flex(SoS.Arch) Y!j= l (Sj== Ability) (19)
Table 4.3. Fuzzification of Flexibility
Fuzzification of Flexibility
Percentage of Systems Participating in the SoS Architecture
Rigid Pliable Flexible Very Flexible
Architecture < 0.3 between 0.3 and 0.5 between 0.5 and 0.85 > 0.85
Robustness is a fuzzy variable which has the values of {None, Little, Robust, 
Very Robust}. The number of system-to-system interfaces and the number of systems 
that cooperate are used to determine the SoS robustness. Mathematically this is given by 
equation (2 0 ).
Robust(SoS. Arch.) N N E i= i (Sj— Ability)(L k = l ^ i = l î,kJ * Y'N (st) (2 0 )
where
Si,k represents an interface between system I and system k 
S'i represents system i
Robustness is fuzzified according to information in Table 4.
Table 4.4. Fuzzification of Robustness
Fuzzification of Robustness
Percentage of System Interfaces Participating in the SoS Architecture
None Little Robust Very Robust
Architecture < 0.3 between 0.3 and 0.5 between 0.5 and 0.85 > 0.85
The performance fuzzy variable has the values of {Poor, Low, Good, 
Exceptional}. The total SoS performance is a ratio of acquired performance over
requested performance and is expressed by equation (21). The fuzzification of 
performance is shown in Table 5.
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Perf (SoS. Arch.) S f = 1S f = 1P i ( C ; )
S f = 1S f = 1P ' i ( c ; ) (2 1 )
Where pi represents the acquired performance from each system and pT represents 
the requested performance from each system.
Table 4.5. Fuzzification of Performance
Fuzzification of Performance
Percentage of System Interfaces Participating in the SoS Architecture
Poor Low Good Exceptional
Architecture < 0.3 between 0.3 and 0.5 between 0.5 and 0.85 > 0.85
The fuzzy assessor is implemented using a FAM where the fuzzy variables of 
affordability, flexibility, robustness, and performance are indices into the FAM to get the 
SoS architecture quality. This is represented mathematically in equation (21).
SoS. Q =
FAM(Afford(SoS. Arch), Flex(SoS. Arch), Robust(SoS. Arch), Perf (SoS. Arch))(21
)
The fuzzy assessor is a function of the SoS architecture that provides the SoS 
architecture quality as a fuzzy value. The SoS architecture quality has the fuzzy values 
{Unacceptable, Marginal, Okay, Exceeds} which must be defuzzified. The centroid 
method of defuzzification is used and is given in equation (2 2 ).
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y =
I,? -T  x e v M  =
S f cV x ( * ; )  y
Z f - ^ x i ^ x f r i )  
S f lice  P x ( x i ) (2 2 )
where
slice = the total number of pieces 
^ x ( x i)  =  the fuzzy membership function






Figure 4.12. SoS Architecture Quality Fuzzy Membership Function
The defuzzification yields a SoS architecture quality value that is a crisp number. 
The next section describes the structure of the fuzzy assessor.
4.1.1.2. Fuzzy assessor structure. Figure 4.13 shows the structure of the SoS 
architecture fuzzy assessor. The fuzzy assessor is implemented inside of the agent-based
model within the SoS agent. The fuzzy assessor is initialized during the SoS_Initialize 
state and is used during the Implement_SoS_Architecture state to check the quality of the 
actual SoS architecture.
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Figure 4.13. Structure of the SoS Fuzzy Assessor
The fuzzy assessor qualitatively evaluates the actual SoS architecture for 
architecture characteristics of affordability, flexibility, robustness, and performance. 
Fuzzy values are determined for the affordability, flexibility, robustness, and 
performance. These fuzzy values are used as indices into the fuzzy associative memory 
(FAM). The FAM contains the fuzzy rules that are the inference engine for the fuzzy 
assessor. The output of the FAM is the fuzzy SoS architecture quality value which is then 
defuzzified to produce a crisp number.
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4.1.2. SoS Behavior. The SoS behavior is part of the SoS agent. One part of this 
research is the SoS behavior exhibited during the plan state when the SoS interfaces with 
the constituent systems. The SoS must work with the systems to get the system 
capabilities necessary to overcome the cyber-attack and achieve Mission Success. Each 
system has its own constraints so there is no guarantee that the system can provide the 
required capabilities that the SoS needs. This section describes the SoS behavior in 
interfacing with the constituent systems. This is a kind of negotiation that the SoS 
performs with each constituent system. For this negotiation Fuzzy Decision Analysis 
(FDA) is employed. The FDA is described in the next section.
4.1.2.1. Fuzzy decision analysis background. Decision analysis is an applied 
methodology used to make decisions [58]. One of the criticisms of decision analysis is 
that the inputs are very often imprecise which results in imprecise outputs [59]. One 
approach to handle the imprecise inputs is using fuzzy set theory [59]. This approach put 
forth by Watson assumes that the inputs are imprecise or fuzzy and proposes the use of 
fuzzy sets to handle this imprecision. Carlsson shows that using fuzzy logic the imprecise 
inputs still provide meaningful results [60]. Carlsson used ordered weighted averaging to 
prove that small changes in the inputs result in small changes in the outputs. Carlsson 
demonstrates how fuzzy decision analysis enhances the corporation decision making of 
two major Finnish forest industries [60]. The point here is that fuzzy decision analysis is 
useful when the inputs are imprecise.
Fuzzy decision analysis has been successfully used in multiple domains as part of 
the decision-making process. In one case, fuzzy decision analysis was used in choosing a
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configuration management tool [61]. The results showed that it worked well in choosing 
the best tool.
In another case, fuzzy decision analysis was used in the planning process during a 
power plant re-licensing activity [62]. In order to be re-licensed, the power plant had to 
collaborate with multiple stakeholders each seeking different outcomes. Fuzzy decision 
analysis was chosen because of its ability to handle the large number of stakeholders 
[62]. In this situation, fuzzy decision analysis was used to negotiate among the various 
stakeholders to provide a solution that was acceptable to each one.
Fuzzy decision analysis was also used in an automated drug delivery system [63]. 
In the automated drug delivery system, fuzzy decision analysis determined the patient 
status and then determined the amount of each of four drugs to dispense into the patient. 
This drug delivery system was more responsive and more effective at regulating the 
drugs than existing systems [63]. In this case defuzzification invoked the center-of- 
gravity method also known as the centroid method.
In the electrical power grid domain, fuzzy decision analysis was used to select the 
best transmission network [64]. Three objectives were input to the fuzzy decision 
analysis: investment cost, congestion cost, and amount of load shedding. The fuzzy 
decision analysis incorporated a linear monotonically decreasing membership function 
for all three objectives. A min-max was used to compare the fuzzy values to the reference 
value (desired value). The fuzzy decision analysis was used on a real power grid with 
results that were superior to other methods.
More recently, fuzzy decision analysis was used in negotiation between the SoS 
and the constituent systems [56]. In this journal paper, fuzzy decision analysis is used by
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the SoS during the negotiation with the constituent systems. The SoS requests capabilities 
from the constituent systems based on the desired SoS architecture. Each system 
responds with what funding, deadline, and performance is necessary for that system to 
support the requested capabilities. The systems’ response of funding, deadline, and 
performance is input to the fuzzy decision analysis which uses that input to determine the 
corresponding action the SoS will take. This same fuzzy decision analysis is implemented 
in the agent-based model to represent the SoS behavior during negotiation with the 
constituent systems.
The literature shows that fuzzy decision analysis can handle imprecise inputs and 
can be effectively used in making decisions. For this reason, fuzzy decision analysis was 
chosen to represent the SoS behavior in the negotiation with the constituent systems.
4.I.2.2. Fuzzy decision analysis implementation. As mentioned in the previous 
section, fuzzy decision analysis has been used in situations where there is uncertainty in 
the inputs and there are many objectives. Fuzzy decision analysis has provided good 
results in these situations.
Figure 4.14 shows the fuzzy decision analysis process. For each capability, the 
SoS receives values for funding, performance, and deadline from the constituent systems 
These values for funding, performance, and deadline are crisp values and are input into 
the fuzzy negotiation model. The fuzzy negotiation model (FNM) is part of the fuzzy 
decision analysis that includes the fuzzy inference engine in the form of a fuzzy 
associative memory (FAM). The first step in the fuzzy negotiation model is the 
fuzzification of the funding, performance, and deadline values. Fuzzification transforms
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the crisp values for funding, performance, and deadline into fuzzy values. The weights 
are already the fuzzy values of {None, Low, High, Heavy}.
Figure 4.14. Fuzzy Decision Analysis Process
The FNM takes as input the performance gap, funding gap, deadline gap, and the 
weight assigned to each capability. The FNM outputs the adjustment to performance, 
adjustment to funding, and adjustment to deadline which are used to calculate new 
performance, funding, and deadline values that are sent to the systems.
Once the funding, performance, and deadline values are fuzzified, the fuzzy 
values are used in the fuzzy associative memory (FAM) along with the fuzzy weight 
value to extract what actions the SoS should take in the negotiation with the constituent 
systems. These actions are fuzzy values that must then be defuzzified into crisp values
that are adjustments to the funding, performance, and deadline for the next negotiation 
cycle. The FAM contains the fuzzy inference engine with the fuzzy rules that determines 
how the funding, performance, and deadline should be adjusted during the negotiation. 
The FAM is implemented as a multidimensional array (Inputs, Rules, Operation) whose 
contents are the Outputs. Equation (23) shows the inputs and equation (24) shows the 
outputs.
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Inputs=(Performance_Gap, Funding_Gap, Deadline_Gap, Weight) (23)
Outputs=(Funding_Adjustment, Deadline_Adjustment, Performance_Adjustment) (24)





• Operations=(AND, OR, NEGATION)
The FAM is implemented in an Excel spreadsheet with each Tab/Worksheet 
being a different Operation. Table 6 is an excerpt from the FAM for illustration purposes.
The fuzzy decision analysis with the fuzzy negotiation model is described in the 
paper published in the International Journal of Soft Computing and Software Engineering 
[56].
The overall approach in the FNM is to move the funding away from the 
capabilities with the lower weights toward the capabilities with the higher weights.
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Gap Weight Funding Deadline Performance
None None None None Decrease Do_Nothing Do_Nothing
None None None Low Do_Nothing Do_Nothing Do_Nothing
None None None High Do_Nothing Do_Nothing Do_Nothing
None None None Heavy Do_Nothing Do_Nothing Do_Nothing
None Low Extreme High Increase_Much Increase Do_Nothing
None Low Extreme Heavy Increase_Much Increase Decrease
Low High Extreme High Do_Nothing Do_Nothing Do_Nothing
Low High Extreme Heavy Do_Nothing Do_Nothing Do_Nothing
High Low Extreme High Increase_Much Increase Do_Nothing
High Low Extreme Heavy Increase_Much Increase_Much Decrease
Extreme High Low Low Do_Nothing Do_Nothing Do_Nothing
Extreme High Low High Do_Nothing Do_Nothing Do_Nothing
Those capabilities with the lower weights would receive an increase in deadline which is 
the equivalent of extending the schedule. This is typical in DoD programs with limited 
funding for the current fiscal year but that do not cause any adverse effects on the 
warfighter if the schedule is extended. The capabilities with the higher weights are those 
that are most important or critical to the SoS and whose deadlines cannot be extended 
without serious impact to the warfighter.
In this approach, those capabilities that are lower weights and whose delta 
funding, delta performance, and delta deadline are “None” would lose some of their 
funding in favor of using that funding on the capabilities with the higher weights. A fuzzy 
value of “None” means that the constituent system accepts the delta funding, delta 
performance, and delta deadline requested by the SoS. Those capabilities with higher
weights and whose delta funding, delta performance, and delta deadline are “None” 
would lose a little funding in favor of those capabilities whose delta funding, delta 
performance, and delta deadline are “Extreme”. A fuzzy value of “Extreme” means that 
there is a large gap between what the SoS requested and what the constituent system can 
provide. Thus, the fuzzy inference rules move the funding, performance, and deadlines 
toward the middle ground.
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4.2. SYSTEM AGENT
This section describes the system agent. The system agent is instantiated multiple 
times once for each system in the simulation. The system agent sends a response message 
to the SoS indicating whether it can provide capabilities to the SoS. Based on what the 
SoS receives from the systems, it updates the SoS architecture. Figure 4.15 shows the 
system agent interface to the SoS.
Each system can be represented as:
S = {A,B,l} (25)
where
S is the system
A is the set of attributes = {a1, a2, ... aj}
B is the behavior of the system
I is the set of interfaces to S = {h, i2, ... ij}
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Figure 4.15. System Interface to the SoS
The systems provide capabilities to the SoS. Within the system agent are 
operations to get the capabilities and the level of help that the system can provide. Once 
the system receives the request from the SoS, the system determines whether it can 
provide those capabilities. Which capabilities the system can provide depends on the 
system state and the system model used. The SARM is designed so that an external 
model developed in another tool such as MATLAB could be used. Or the system model 
could be embedded in the system agent. For this research, the system agent uses a fuzzy 
decision system to determine the level of support the system can provide to the SoS. The
fuzzy inference engine (FIE) is part of the fuzzy decision system and takes fuzzy inputs 
and then outputs the results to be sent to the SoS.The FIE takes the following inputs:
• System constraints (ability to evolve and change)
• System resources
• System funding
The FIE outputs a cooperation level that the system can provide to the SoS. The 
cooperation is {None, Little, Cooperate, High}. Figure 4.16 shows the system agent 
structure.
After the system determines the cooperation level, the System Response Message 
is sent to the SoS. The System Response Message contains the cooperation indication. If 
the system cooperation level is None or little, then the system includes suggestion for 
funding, deadline, and performance in the response message. The SoS evaluates the SoS 
architecture using these system funding, deadline, and performance values using the 
Fuzzy Architecture Assessor (FAA). The interface between the SoS and the constituent 
systems reflects the ability of the constituent systems to support the Mission as requested 
by the SoS. The system agent behavior and can be modeled in multiple ways using a 
probability function, Monte Carlo analysis, or FDA. In this research an FDA and a 
probability function were both used with similar results.
Figure 4.17 illustrates the System State Transition Diagram. The System agent 
has three states: Maybe, Helping, and NoHelping. The Maybe state is the initial state and 
where the system stays until it receives a request from the SoS for required capabilities. 
Once the request is received the system uses a FAM to determine whether it can support 
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Figure 4.16. System Agent Structure
After the decision is made, the system exits the Maybe state and the system 
moves to either the Helping or the NotHelping state. In both the Helping and NotHelping 
states the system sends the response to the SoS indicating whether the system can provide 












Figure 4.17. System Agent State Transition Diagram
4.3. THREAT AGENT
This section describes the threat agent. The threat agent represents the cyber­
attack on the SoS. The threat agent is instantiated multiple times once for each threat in 
the simulation. The threat agent can attack a system or a system interface. Figure 4.18
shows this interaction.
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Figure 4.18. Interaction of the Threats with the Systems
Figure 4.19 illustrates the Threat State Transition Diagram. The Threat agent has 
three states: Thinking, Kill_Interface, and Kill_System. The Thinking state is the initial 
state and where the Threat determines whether to attack a system interface or a system. 
The Threat then exits the Thinking state and moves to the Kill_Interface or Kill_System 
state. In the Kill_Interface state the Threat destroys one of the system to system 
interfaces. In the Kill_System state the Threat destroys a system.
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Figure 4.19. Threat Agent State Transition Diagram
Threats are in the Environment and Threats affect the weights (wi) associated 
with each capability (Ci). Depending on the Threats some Capabilities would be more 
important than other Capabilities and thus the associated weights for those capabilities 
would be higher.
W j  a  T h r e a ts (26)
A Fuzzy Inference Engine implemented as a FAM will use the Threats and 
National Priorities to determine the weights (wi) for each capability (Ci). FAM will
contain the Fuzzy Inference Rules.
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Environmental influences are represented as the variables:
• Th = Threats
• NP = National Priorities 
Rules for NP and Th are:
1. If no NP and no Th then there is no adjustment to the weights.
2. User Inputs for NP and Th will adjust the weights (wi) for each capability 
to reflect the influence of NP and Th on the SoS behavior.
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This section contains the results of this research. The results show that the 
Mission Resiliency can be measured using a model to represent the SoS and the systems 
that are key to the Mission. Each system represents a part of the Mission Thread and is 
necessary for Mission Success. The loss of a system or interface represents a cyber-attack 
resulting in a degraded state that must still complete the Mission. Mission Resiliency can 
be considered as how well the SoS can still complete the Mission after a cyber-attack.
The SARM is the proof of concept for the approach to Mission Resilience described in 
this dissertation.
Implementation of the SARM is like the implementation of the SoS architecture 
development model for the Infantry Immersion Training System (IITS) domain [65]. The 
IITS provides a specific Mission and SoS to use in the SARM. The SARM was executed 
using the IITS SoS which consists of the soldier’s gear, the monitoring equipment, the 
urban environment, and the command center. The command center is the SoS and the 
soldier’s gear, the monitoring equipment, and the urban environment are systems 1, 2 , 
and 3, respectively. The simulation was executed using just one threat. The SARM inputs 
for this simulation are identified in Table 7. The simulation results are shown in Figure
5.1. The results show the number of cycles for each epoch and a general decrease in the 
number of cycles. This implies an increase in resilience since less cycles means the SoS 
is faster at adjusting the architecture after a cyber-attack.
The SARM was also executed using a generic SoS with 20 constituent systems 
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Figure 5.1. SARM IITS Simulation Results
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The SARM generic simulation results are shown in Figure 5.2. The generic 
simulation shows the resilience for a SoS with the number of systems, capabilities, and
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interfaces shown in Table 8 . In this case, the results again show the number of cycles per 
















Figure 5.2. SARM Generic Simulation Results
The SARM was executed using a probability for system cooperation instead of 
the FAM. The results using the probability were like the results using the FAM.
The SARM simulation has the displays shown in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4. The 
display shows the plot of number of systems that agree to the SoS request as well as the 
number of systems that are not able to support the SoS request. This plot shows how the
greater the number of systems that are not able to help the larger the number of 
negotiation cycles and the lower the resilience capacity.
The displays in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 also show a plot of the number of 
negotiation cycles over time. This plot and the graph directly above show how the 
number of systems not supporting the SoS request impacts the number of negotiation 
cycles. The number of negotiation cycles is inversely proportional to the resilience.
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Figure 5.3. Model Simulation Display
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The following section describes the conclusions.
Figure 5.4. Simulation with Multiple Threats
67
This section contains the conclusions drawn from the results.
6.1. FULFILLED RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The research objective of this effort was to develop an approach to Mission 
Resiliency and a prototype model as a proof of concept. The SoS architecture resiliency 
model (SARM) is the prototype model developed during this research. The SARM does 
provide a proof of concept to the approach to resiliency. The results in the previous 
section support this approach to Mission Resilience.
6.2. CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THIS RESEARCH
To summarize, the contributions from this research are:
• Method to evaluate Enterprise or SoS architecture resilience
• SARM
• FAA
• FDA and FNM representing the SoS behavior
• FAM that contains fuzzy rules which can be altered for different scenarios
6.3. CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE RESULTS
The following conclusions can be derived from the results. The results show that 
the more systems that are not able to support the SoS request the less resilient the system 
and the more likely that the Mission will fail. As the simulation executes the on-screen
6. CONCLUSIONS
graphs show the relationship between constituent system support and completing the 
Mission. The graphs show the number of negotiation cycles increasing as fewer systems 
support the SoS capabilities meaning the resilience capacity is decreasing.
As mentioned earlier, the objective of this research was to develop an approach to 
resiliency assessment based on mission success. The literature review described earlier 
research in resiliency. The literature review showed that earlier resiliency research was 
focused on specific domains and not on the Mission. The research in this dissertation 




This research focuses on Mission Resiliency where the Mission is the focus of the 
assessment. The approach uses the SoS architecture which is a key element of the 
Mission. This research provides the model and approach to do the assessment using a 
simple context. Future work would include the expansion of the model and assessment to 
allow for additional threats and systems in the model.
The SARM was developed to address one specific Mission. This was necessary to 
lay the foundation for more complex scenarios. Another area for future work is the 
addition of multiple Missions. This would raise the complexity of the SARM 
exponentially and so is more appropriate for future work.
The SARM has an interface to the SoS architecture model that contains the 
DoDAF architecture views that describe the SoS architecture. This interface is not 
automatic and requires some manual assistance. Future work could include streamlining 
this interface and making it more automatic and robust.
The SARM uses a FAM in the system agent to determine whether the system can 
support the SoS request. Another approach would be to also use an FDA to determine 
how to adjust the funding, deadline, and performance sent back to the SoS. The SARM 
can use other models to represent the system behavior. In other papers [56], the SoS 
development model used models developed in Matlab to represent the system behavior.
The same can be done for SARM.
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8. DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
This section provides definitions and terminology that will assist the reader in 
understanding the rest of the document. Some of the explanations in the following 
sections are using the terminology and definitions presented herein. An acronym list is 
also included here.
8.1. DEFINITIONS
The following definitions are used within this document:
• Agent -  is the independent process that is unique and can exhibit 
individualized behavior.
• Agent-Based Model -  model whose basic elements are agents.
• Model -  is a representation of an entity [(Dainth, 2012)].
• SoS Manager -  is the person or organization responsible for the SoS 
development.
• Resilience Capacity -  measure of resilience in terms of the SoS ability to 
successfully complete the Mission despite a cyber-attack.
8.2. ASSUMPTIONS
This section lists the assumptions made during this research. In order to complete 
this research in a timely manner, certain assumptions were made to focus the scope of 
this effort. In this regard, the following assumptions were made:
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• No system-to-system interactions
• Focused on DoD Mission and SoS
• Systems defined by their capabilities and interfaces
• SoS architecture quality results in Mission Success
• Only one Mission per simulation
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APPENDIX
Table A- 1. System FAM
Constraints Resources Funding Cooperate?
1 1 1 1
1 1 2 1
1 1 3 1
1 1 4 1
2 2 2 3
2 2 3 1
2 2 3 2
2 2 3 3
2 2 4 1
2 2 4 3
2 2 4 3
2 2 4 3
2 3 1 1
3 3 3 4
4 4 4 1
4 4 4 3
4 4 4 3
4 4 4 4
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